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Abstract
In this paper, I address the question of what the Developmental Systems Theory (DST) aims 
at explaining. I distinguish two lines of thought in DST, one which deals specifically with 
development, and tries to explain the development of the individual organism, and the other 
which presents itself as a reconceptualization of evolution, and tries to explain the evolution 
of  populations  of  developmental  systems (organism-environment  units).  I  emphasize  that, 
despite  the  claiming  of  the  contrary  by  DST  proponents,  there  are  two  very  different 
definitions  of  the  ‘developmental  system’,  and  therefore  DST is  not  a  unified  theory  of 
evolution and development.  I show that the DST loses the most interesting aspects of its 
reconceptualization of development when it  tries to reconceptualize evolutionary theory.  I 
suggest that DST is about development  per se, and that it fails at offering a new view on 
evolution.
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1. Introduction
As a general perspective, what does Developmental Systems Theory (DST) seek to explain? 
While  being  very sympathetic  to  DST,  one can see  a  tension here.  The problem can be 
expressed in this way: is DST’s aim to explain the characteristics of the individual organism? 
Or, in more concrete terms, and following the example taken by (Griffiths and Gray 1994): 
should DST explain both Paul Griffiths’s having a thumb on each hand and having a scar on 
his left hand? DST people have given two strongly different answers to this question. One 
choice within DST, best illustrated by Oyama’s Ontogeny of Information (2000a [1985]), is to 
answer that DST’s aim is indeed to explain the characteristics of the individual organism. A 
second choice within DST, which appears in Oyama’s Evolution’s Eye (2000b, e.g. pages 28-
29) but which is best illustrated by several papers by Griffiths and Gray (1994, 1997, 2001, 
2004),  is  to answer that  the first  aim of DST is to explain,  not  the characteristics  of the 
individual  organism,  but  the  co-evolution  of  organisms  and  their  environments  (that  is, 
evolution of Œs [GG 2001), or, in other words, evolution of developmental systems). 
   In this paper, I present these two answers, then I try to show that with the second one both 
the uniqueness and the unity of the organism are lost. I claim that the adoption of this second 
answer  leads  to  the  loss  of  the  main  conceptual  gains  of  the  first  one,  without  being 
compensated by a true profit in the reconceptualization of evolution by natural selection. I 
conclude that DST is a radically new vision of development, but not of evolution by natural 
selection.
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2.  First  answer:  the  characteristics  of  the  individual  organism  as  the 
explanandum of DST
2.1. Explaining individual characteristics
According to this first answer – best expressed by Oyama (2000a), but which also appears in 
Lewontin’s writings on development1, in Gottlieb (1992)2, and in some texts by Griffiths and 
Gray3 – the general task of the biologist involved in developmental issues is to account for the 
construction  of  the  characteristics  of  an  individual  organism throughout  its  life.  In  other 
words, it is to account for the individual development (individual ontogeny) of an organism, 
with the idea that development  lasts from conception to death. Here (and throughout this 
paper),  individuality must not be confused with  uniqueness: an individual organism is  one 
(isolable) organism4, characterized by both common (sometimes species-typical) and unique 
traits. According to the first answer we are examining now, biologists should account both for 
the unique traits of an organism and for the traits which it shares with others. Oyama (2000a: 
137) quotes Lewontin on this matter: 
[developmental biologists are] so fascinated with how an egg turns into a chicken that they have ignored 
the critical  fact  that  every  egg turns  into  a  different  chicken  and that  each chicken’s  right  side is 
different in an unpredictable way from its left5
   In this first answer, the stress is put on the development of the individual organism. Indeed, 
the  expected  influence  on  biology  is  a  reconceptualization  of  development.  The 
developmental point of view comes first, even though, secondarily, it can have consequences 
on evolutionary issues6.
   The explanandum, then, is the characteristics of the individual organism. The explanans is 
the  individual developmental system (DS). What does the individual DS contain? It is an 
epistemological notion: it contains all the resources which explain why this organism is as it 
is. The consequence is that explaining the individual traits of an organism implies to take into 
account many things,  i.e., all the ‘developmental resources’, which all contribute to explain 
the characteristics of this individual organism. As we see, this epistemologically defined DS is 
quite big.
   But isn’t it too big? Indeed, it seems that the DS includes many resources (all those which 
are relevant to explain the characteristics of the individual organism), and therefore, possibly, 
too many ressources. For example, to take up an example of Griffiths and Gray (1994), is the 
scar on Griffiths’ left hand part of his DS? Precisely because the DS contains all the resources 
which  explain why this organism is as it is, within this first answer,  Griffiths’ scar is to be 
explained. The DS accounts for ontogenetical individuality7. So, the ‘surgeon’s knife’, which 
Griffiths and Gray exclude from the DS, is in fact part of it, because it is an explanation of an 
individual trait – which happens to be unique. Similarly, though Sterelny, Smith and Dickison 
(1996) tend to make fun of this idea, in this first strategy,  Elvis Presley is clearly part of 
Dickison’s DS, because Presley is one of the resources which explain why Dickison is like he 
is (let’s say, a rock-lover). The fact that the DS is big is not a problem, for two reasons. First, 
1 Though Lewontin is a population geneticist, many of his points are about development, and more precisely 
about our understanding of what causes this development in this organism (Lewontin 1994, 2000a, 2000b).
2 Lewontin and Gottlieb are two of the major references cited by DST proponents.
3 For example the section ‘Taking development seriously’ in Griffiths and Gray (1994), but also many arguments 
of Gray (1992) and Gray (2001).
4 As difficult as delineating the organism may be: on this question (which is different from that of delineating the 
developmental system), see Oyama (2006).
5 Same idea in Lewontin (1994 : 11) : ‘‘Developmental biologists concentrate on the question of how lions give 
rise to lions and lambs give rise to lambs, but they never ask the question, ‘Why are all lambs not identical’ ’’. 
6 In  fact,  Oyama  started  with  the  nature/nurture  question,  which  led  her  to  developmental  issues,  and 
subsequently to evolutionary issues.
7 Which, again, includes both unique and common characteristics.
2
in this first option, there is no ontology of the DSs, contrary to what we will see with the 
second option. The DS is epistemologically, and not ontologically, defined. In other words, 
the DS is indeed huge, with many resources overlapping with other DSs, but the size of the 
DS is not a problem, because the biological entity is the  organism, not the DS itself. What 
develops is organisms and what evolves is populations of organisms. Second, it should be 
clear that in this first option the DST does not state that the task of each biologist is to explain 
all the individual traits of all organisms. DST people are much more down-to-earth than it is 
usually said: they consider that a biologist starts with a well-defined question. For example, 
her question can be: why does this particular fly have eyes with many facets? She will not 
need to resort to all resources to explain what she seeks to explain: she will choose what is 
relevant. Thus, we cannot say that there is an epistemological problem in the size of the DS.
2.2. Aim of this first option: a reconceptualization of developmental causality
The aim of this first  option is  to reconceptualize  the causality  of development.  Here,  the 
enemies of DST are genetic determinism8,  internalism and preformationism9.  As Godfrey-
Smith (2000 and 2001) showed, the best way to define DST is to present it as a strong anti-
preformationism. He also clearly demonstrates that the reconceptualization of developmental 
causality is a key element of DST, as is obvious in (Oyama 2000a). Here are the key points of 
the reconceptualization of developmental causality that she offers (followed by Griffiths and 
Gray, and others), hierarchically organized from the most to the less generally admitted by 
biologists: 
1. Genes do not play a central, not even a privileged role, in development (that is, 
genes are not controllers of development).
2. Factors which play a role in development are not separate channels; they become 
causally relevant only by their interaction.
3. The nature/nurture dichotomy should be got ridden of.
   In order to show how strong and original these points are, I would like to contrast what DST 
people say with what someone as sympathetic to DST views as Peter Godfrey-Smith (2001) 
says.  After  conceding that  genes do  not  code for  phenotypic  traits,  he  claims  that  genes 
certainly code for proteins (and that proteins make a critical contribution to the characteristics 
of an individual organism). But here, DST makes, I think, a strong point, by refusing this 
claim. For DST, genes are only necessary conditions (among others) for the synthesis of an 
organism’s proteins. This implies first that there are (many) other necessary conditions, and 
second that even if material DNA (i.e. some material ‘stuff’) is present in the egg cell, the 
causal power of DNA10 in development only arises through the interactions with other factors. 
A very simple (but very convincing) example is the demethylation of some parts of DNA 
according  to  the  local  environment  of  the  cell  (e.g.  Reik  2007).  According  to  this 
environment, proteins ‘choose’ which genes will be activated. This is the crux of the matter in 
Oyama’s demonstration:  things are ‘already here’ in a sense (genetic things, but also other 
things – that is, all the developmental resources upon which the DS depends), but these things 
become  information11 only  through  the  interactions  of  many  different  elements.  In  other 
8 The term ‘genocentrism’, though widely used, should be avoided: it can refer both to genetic determinism and 
to genic selectionism. These two ideas, though sometimes coexistent in one mind or one book, are logically very 
different.
9 Which does definitely not imply that DST proponents argue in favor of an environmental determination of 
individual characteristics: they reject all forms of simple determinism. Nevertheless, the view against which they 
struggle the most is genetic determinism.
10 Or ‘genes’ in an informational (not material) sense.
11 Because DST people are often suspicious about the notion of ‘information’, it is probably more accurate to 
say: ‘things become causally relevant’ or ‘play a causal role’. Contrary to what Godfrey-Smith (2001) says, I 
think Susan Oyama’s argumentation is: i) I don’t really like informational language, and ii) if you really want to 
talk about information, then you cannot consider genes as the only source of information in the construction of 
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words, nothing becomes a developmental cause without interacting with other interactants. It 
is a point which is much more original and much stronger that it  is usually thought. The 
consequences are that there is no ‘nature’, there is no nature/nurture dichotomy as usually 
conceived. This thesis has enormous developmental implications, and also important social, 
political, etc. implications (see in particular Oyama 2000b and Oyama, 2009). 
 
3. Second answer: the co-evolution of organisms and their environments as 
the explanandum of DST
3.1. Explaining the evolution of organisms and their environments
The people involved in this second answer are mainly Griffiths and Gray, but also, as we said, 
Oyama in  some  texts  of  (2000b: 28-29;  see  also  Chapter  3,  ‘Ontogeny  and  the  Central 
Dogma’).  Two important  sources  are Lewontin on co-construction (1978;  2000; etc.)  and 
Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman on niche construction (2003). In this second option, the 
enemies  of  DST  are  genic  selectionism and  all  forms  of  externalism  (usually  under  the 
metaphor of ‘adaptationism’12). This option being mainly illustrated by Griffiths and Gray, 
here I will focus on their writings.
   According  to  the  second  answer,  what  DST  seeks  to  explain  is  not  anymore  the 
characteristics  of  the  individual  organism,  but  the  co-evolution  of  organisms  and  their 
environments. In other words, the explanandum is the co-evolution of organisms and their 
environments,  that  is,  the  evolution  of  populations  of  Œs  (an  Œ is  a  unit  made  by  the 
organism and its environment), that is, the evolution of populations of evolutionary DSs. The 
explanans is historical-adaptive explanations (Griffiths and Gray 1994). 
   What is an evolutionary DS? It is ‘the resources that produce the developmental outcomes 
that  are  stably  replicated  in  that  lineage’  (Griffiths  and  Gray  1994:  278)13.  So  the 
developmental resources which explain traits that an organism has but that its descendants do 
not have are not part of the evolutionary DS. The evolutionary DS is obtained by abstraction 
from the individual DS14:  ‘In evolutionary terms the DS contains all  those features which 
reliably recur in each generation and which help to reconstruct the normal life cycle of the 
evolving lineage’15. The result is an ‘idealized DS of a particular lineage’ (Griffiths and Gray 
2001: 207)16.
3.2. Aim of this second option: a reconceptualization of evolution
The aim of this second option is to build an entire reconceptualization of evolutionary theory. 
It  implies  a  redefinition  of  key  evolutionary  concepts  and  of  evolutionary  individuals17. 
According  to  (Griffiths  and  Gray  1994:  304),  evolution  should  be  redefined  as  ‘the 
differential replication of developmental processes/life cycles’. In (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 
207), they suggest: ‘Evolution is change in the nature of populations of DSs.’ Thus, in the 
second option, the DS became the explanandum, it is not anymore the explanans of DST.
the individual organism.
12 Lewontin (1978), Gould and Lewontin (1979). Instead of ‘adaptation’, the appropriate metaphor is said to be 
‘construction’ (Lewontin 1978, Odling-Smee et al. 2003). 
13 The same idea appears in (Griffiths and Gray 2001): ‘all the resources which produce those developmental 
outcomes that are reliably reproduced in a lineage’).
14 ‘Just as a traditional model of evolution abstracts away from the unique features of individual phenotypes’, as 
Griffiths and Gray say in (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 207). 
15 Note that “contains” differs from “is”. The question is : does it contain only that, or more than that ?
16 Word for word the same idea is expressed in (Griffiths and Gray 2004: 12).
17 See  (Griffiths  and  Gray  1994:  300):  ‘Taking  developmental  processes,  rather  than  genes  or  traditional 
phenotypes, to be units of evolution requires a substantial reformulation of evolutionary theory’; see also the last 
two pages of Griffiths and Gray 2001.
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3.3. Consequence: the two different definitions of the ‘developmental system’
The evolutionary DS is clearly different from the DS as defined in the first option. Indeed, 
from this evolutionary DS, Griffiths and Gray explicitly exclude Griffiths’s scar – or, to be 
more  accurate,  they  exclude  from  the  evolutionary  DS  the  interactions that  produced 
Griffith’s scar, because there is no evolutionary explanation of this scar, for the scar is not 
stably replicated in the lineage (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 286). Griffiths and Gray themselves 
contrast this definition of the DS with the individual DS: “The DS of an individual organism 
contains all the unique events that are responsible for individual differences, deformities, and 
so forth”. For their part, by ‘individual’, they mean idiosyncratic, unique (e.g. Griffiths and 
Gray 1994: 286: ‘The scar is an individual trait’). In (1994: 287), Griffiths and Gray write: 
‘For other explanatory purposes, such as the study of developmental abnormalities, a different 
system must be delineated’. 
   Thus, we do have two developmental systems: 
i) The individual DS, that is, all the resources which explain why this organism is as it 
is (with both unique and common traits). It is the DS as Oyama (2000a) defines it.
ii)  The evolutionary  DS,  that  is,  all  the  resources  that  produce  the  developmental 
outcomes  that  are  stably  replicated  in  that  lineage.  It  is  the  DS  as  Griffiths  and  Gray 
(especially 1994 and 1997) define it.
   It is noteworthy that Susan Oyama admits that there are two possible definitions of the DS, 
and that the one which is preferable is the individual one, even when evolutionary questions 
are  being  asked.  See  (Oyama  2000a:  141,  in  the  section  called  “DS  in  ontogeny  and 
phylogeny”)18: 
“but to restrict the term [system] to species-typical developmental pathways and structures would defeat 
the purpose of the conceptual organization being attempted here. [...] Scientists are usually interested in 
common and/or enduring interactional networks, but one might want to investigate rare or transient ones 
as well. A unique historical sequence or an individual life may be worth our attention.”19
   The table below sums up the differences between the two answers we have examined.
Strategies Individual DS Evolutionary DS
Explanandum Traits of an individual 
organism
Co-evolution of O and E (= evolution 
of populations of DSs)
Explanans Developmental system Historical-adaptive explanations20
People Mainly Oyama Mainly Griffiths and Gray
Sources Gottlieb, Lewontin on 
development, etc.
Lewontin against adaptation; Odling-
Smee et al.; etc.
Enemies Preformationism, internalism, 
genetic determinism
Genic selectionism, all forms of 
externalism
Biological entities Organisms Developmental systems
18 Susan Oyama also confirmed this idea in a personal communication.
19 Here we see clearly the filiation between Lewontin (e.g. in the quotation given above) and Oyama.
20 An ‘etiological solution’ (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 278). And on page 287: ‘adaptive-historical explanation’. 
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4. The loss of two key aspects in the second answer
Adopting the second option (that of the evolutionary DS) leads to the loss of two key aspects 
of the first option:
i) The loss of the uniqueness of the organism: in the second answer, one must explain 
the maintaining of biological forms through time, of course with some minor variations21, and 
to do so one must isolate among developmental ressources those (and only those) ‘whose 
presence in each generation is responsible for the characteristics that are stably replicated in 
that lineage’ (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 286).
ii)  The loss of the unity of the organism:  one loses the idea that it is the organism 
which evolves when one says that it is the O-E system which evolves, i.e. the D.S. (or the life 
cyle). The DS fuses the organism and the environment. Indeed, Griffiths and Gray claim that 
there is no meaningful distinction between the organism and the environment: “perhaps the 
most  radical  departure  [from  the  classical  evolutionary  theory]  is  that  the  separation  of 
organism and environment is called into question” (1994: 300). Griffiths and Gray are even 
clearer in two later texts. In (2001: 207), they suggest to use the symbol ‘Œ’ in models of 
evolution,  and  write  ‘we  claim  that  there  is  no  distinction  between  organism  and 
environment’. The same idea appears in (Griffiths and Gray 2004: 11-12, section “Fitness and 
adaptation”). This loss of the unity of the organism is related to what I take as an implicit aim 
of Griffiths and Gray, that is, an ontological revision. There is, here, a parallel with Richard 
Dawkins22.  As  Dawkins  says  that  the  biological  world  is  better  seen  as  made,  not  of 
organisms,  but  of  genes  having  extended  phenotypes,  Griffiths  and  Gray  say  that  the 
biological world is better seen as made, not of organisms, but of DSs. If one follows their 
demonstration, the organism is not a theoretically justified entity. Gray (1992: 199) strongly 
emphasizes that his view is not a ‘return to the organism’. It contrasts with Bateson (2005) 
and,  even more  importantly,  with  Oyama  (2000b:  30-31):  at  the  very moment  when she 
defines  developmental  systems  in  evolution,  Oyama  explains  that  her  aim is  to  “put  the 
organisms back” in evolution, and to “restore the organism”.
   Now, one may ask, what is the problem? After all, isn’t it natural that the unique traits of the 
individual  organism are  lost,  and that  the  organism itself  tends  to  disappear  as  the  main 
biologically relevant unit, since we are talking about evolution? The problem is that this issue 
about the role of the organism in DST that I have analysed here shows that there is no real 
unity of the theory (the DST), because we have different  explananda in the two different 
strategies. In recent writings, Griffiths and Gray claim23 that there is only one DS, but in fact 
there are two very different DSs, doing very different things. 
   What exactly is lost in the second option, that represented by Griffiths and Gray? The loss 
of the individual organism is in fact the loss of key aspects of development: as the first option 
shows,  the  biologist  (especially  the  developmental  biologist)  must  explain  the  traits  of 
individual organisms, because all organisms are different, especially – but not exclusively – 
those which sexually reproduce (see Lewontin’s  quotations above).  It  is  what  research on 
developmental noise (see Lewontin 2000) and phenotypic plasticity (West-Eberhard 2003) 
show.  In  fact,  we  could  claim  that  very  few  ‘characteristics’  or  ‘outcomes’  are  stably 
replicated in one lineage. Of course, they are definitely  important, because natural selection 
acts on traits which last across generations (varying only slightly), but my point is that so few 
resources involved in individual development are stably replicated that with such a definition 
of the DS most of development (as understood in the first answer) is lost. Griffiths and Gray 
21 (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 286): ‘the theory aims to provide an explanation of transgenerational stability’.
22 In a section called ‘DSs and extended phenotypes’ (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 288), Griffiths and Gray write: 
‘The idea of a DS has certain parallels with Richard Dawkins’s notion of the extended phenotype’.  The same 
idea appears in (Gray 1992: 195). 
23 See (Griffiths and Gray 2004). In their 1994 paper, Griffiths and Gray say that their ‘main aim’ was ‘to make 
the idea [of a DS] precise’ (page 304), but they have dealt with only one definition of the DS.
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say (1994: 278) they want to produce ‘a general account of development and evolution’24. I 
think they fail, because they lose most of development.
   Moreover,  if we turn to evolution, we realize that the vast majority of examples used by 
DST people (both Griffiths and Gray, and Oyama) to justify their thesis about an ‘extended 
inheritance’ are in fact not ‘inherited’ in a strong ‘natural selection’ sense. To understand 
inheritance, we need a proper concept of replicator. Griffiths and Gray make a critique of the 
replicator concept (1994: 299-300)25, but I do not think they use a proper definition of the 
replicator.  In  my  view,  a  replicator  is  something  which  fulfills  three  criteria:  i)  faithful 
transmission;  ii)  differential  transmission  (most  often,  individual  transmission);  iii) 
transmission correlated to the expression of traits which themselves are correlated with better 
survival and/or reproductive success. The replicator is not the key controller of development, 
that’s beside the point (at least in the view defended here). With these three criteria, examples 
like cell membranes, most of cytoplasmic elements (but not mitochondria, of course), etc. 
have to be excluded. They simply do not pass the test. Some of these traits are, like antibodies 
transmitted from the mother to the child for instance,  necessary conditions for survival, but 
they  are  not  relevant  from  the  point  of  view  of  natural  selection.  Indeed,  antibodies 
transmitted from mother to child are probably indispensable for the child’s survival, but this 
child will not transmit these antibodies to the next generation, so the ‘success’ of a lineage 
cannot be due to the ‘quality’ of its antibodies. Kim Sterelny seems right when he says that 
what is needed is an extended replicator conception, even though I prefer the conception of a 
replicator defended here than the one presented, for instance, in Sterelny et al. (1996). I also 
agree with Sterelny that endosymbionts pass the test and therefore are very good replicators 
(see also Sterelny, 2001).
   The consequence of all that has been said here is that the evolutionary DS has lost the great 
majority of its developmental characteristics: it has lost its unique traits, but also traits which 
are certainly important for survival, but which are not replicated in a strong sense.
   Hence, two points follow from what has been said here:
1) We really have two very different definitions of the DS.
2) The second DS has lost most of its developmental traits.
   So I think that, thanks to the analysis of these two different definitions of the DS, we see 
that the unity of the developmental systems theory is lost, or at least deeply threatened.
5. Conclusion
   My conclusion is that DST is a radically new vision of development, but not a fruitful 
reconceptualization of evolution by natural selection. Griffiths and Gray say that they want to 
‘bring out the radical  implications  of the new approach to development for the theory of 
evolution’  (1994:  278),  but  I  do  not  think  they  succeeded  in  doing  so.  If  the  argument 
developed here is correct, DST is a fascinating and very productive account of development, 
centered on the individual organism – and, again, I want to insist that this view is expressed 
both by Susan Oyama and by some Griffiths and Gray’s texts. Thus, I would like to tell DST 
people that what they suggest about development is fascinating and that  it  is enough, and 
therefore that they need not to offer in addition to that a reconceptualization of evolution.
Acknowledgments
24 And section II of their 1994 paper is entitled : ‘Taking development seriously’ (page 283). 
25 1) ‘If the replicator is something that self-replicates’: but it is not! – at least, it is not a necessary component of 
a  replicator ;  2)  If  a  replicator  is  ‘anything  that  is  reliably  replicated  in  development,  there  will  be  many 
replicators’. But it is not: a replicator is reliably and differentially  replicated (and also correlated with survival 
and/or reproductive success). Few things, in fact, fulfill these three criteria of being reliably and differentially 
replicated, and correlated with survival and/or reproductive success.
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